How Wage Offers Affect Job Applicants: Field Experiment Evidence on Directed Search

北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院教授、博士生导师。主要研究领域为亲社会行为、团队决策、就业市场、公共政策评估。近年来在Experimental Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization、Journal of Economic Psychology、Economics Letters、China Economic Review、Environment and Development Economics、Environment and Planning A、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》、《世界经济》等期刊上发表多篇论文。

We explore the impact of wage offers on job applications, testing implications of the directed search model. We conducted a field experiment on a Chinese job board, with job ads for which we randomly varied the wage offer. We find that higher wages attract more job applicants, and higher-quality job applicants. These results are consistent with predictions from directed search models.