Job Matching under Constraints-厦门大学经济学院统计学与数据科学系

Job Matching under Constraints

主讲人:Ning Yu
主讲人简介:

 CV:Upload/File/2018/10/20181024041909534.pdf

主持人:Menghan Xu
简介:

Abstract:In a Kelso-Crawford job market framework, we consider arbitrary constraints on the sets of doctors that hospitals can hire. Constraints preserve the substitutes condition if and only if they are generalized interval constraints. When doctors are gross substitutes, competitive equilibria always exist under mild assumptions unless the government imposes other types of constraints. Competitive equilibrium allocations of a market under interval constraints are also those of an unconstrained market with a certain government transfer policy. For markets with interval constraints and beyond, new techniques help demonstrate comparative statics.

时间:2018-10-29(Monday)16:40-18:00
地点:N302, Econ Building
主办单位:SOE&WISE
承办单位:经济学系
类型:系列讲座
专题网站:
联系人信息:

关闭